






The Aspectual Shape of 
Value Experience and the Problem of Evil
Abstract
Traditional responses to the problem of evil may be classed as ‘logical’ responses, insofar 
as they aim to show that God’s existence is logically compatible with evil and suffering. In 
this paper I discuss what might be called a non­logical or ‘aporetic’ response. According to 
the aporetic response, the problem of evil appears to us as intractable, but it does so only 
because of the limitedness of human minds. I argue on independent grounds that human 
minds are limited in a specific way: our experience of value is, in an important respect, 
aspectually shaped (aspectual	shape is a term is used by Tim Crane, John Searle, and others 
in the philosophy of perception). This thesis is useful for understanding various syndromes 
in the way we relate to normative areas like ethics, aesthetics, politics or religion. It can 







































aporetic	 theories	 are	 relatively	 rare.	 It	 is	 striking,	 for	 instance,	 that	whilst	












emotive	 experience	 of	 value,	 rather	 than	 our	 rational	 understanding	 of	 the	
problem.	By	 ‘value’	we	often	mean	moral	value.	We	can	also	 include	aes-
thetic,	epistemic,	or	religious	value.	Value	is	frequently	defined	in	terms	of	




















































I	 call	 ‘aspectual	 shape’.	The	 term	 ‘aspectual	 shape’	 is	used	by	Tim	Crane,	






















that	 moral	 and	 aesthetic	 language	 functions	
only	to	express	emotion.	As	noted,	it	is	now	
widely	 thought	 that	 emotions	 involve	 judg-
ments.	 If	 so,	 emotivism	may	not	have	 to	be	



























































kind of infidelity to the suffering people were undergoing.	But	in	another	way,	
Mitchell’s	critics	were	utterly	wrong.	How	does	this	come	about?	Part	of	the	
answer,	I	think,	is	that	when	we	think	about	the	lesser	case	of	suffering	–	when 
we fully appreciate it	–	there	is,	as	it	were,	no	room	left	for	us	to	appreciate	the	
greater.	This	is	an	example	of	aspectual	shape.
The	explanatory	power	of	my	thesis	 is	 increased	when	we	combine	it	with	
distinction	between	description	 and	 expression.	For	our	purposes	 ‘descrip-



















If	what	 I	have	 said	 is	 right,	 the	aspectual	 shape	of	value	experience	 repre-
sents	 a	 fundamental	 problem	 for	 communication.	For	we	 can’t	 just	 cut	 off	
the	expressive	component	of	language	–	we	cannot	stop	our	language	from	
occasioning	value	experience.	And	as	John	Cottingham	points	out	in	his	paper	
“What	 is	Humane	Philosophy	and	Why	is	 it	at	Risk?”	 the	part	of	 language	
we’re	concerned	with	here,	its	resonances	of	emotion	and	imagination,	are	as	
present	when	we	do	philosophy	as	at	any	other	time	(Cottingham	2009:	253).
Aspectual Shape and the Problem of Evil













































































problem	of	evil.	 I	propose	 that	we	understand	 the	situation	 in	 terms	of	 the	


















pressively	 inept	with	 respect	 to	evil	 and	 suffering.	But	 this	does	not	mean	







compelling	 independently	motivated	 theory,	and	one	 that	may	be	of	use	 in	
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Aspektni oblik iskustva vrijednosti i problem zla
Sažetak
Tradicionalni odgovori na problem zla mogu se klasificirati kao »logički« odgovori utoliko 
ukoliko im je cilj pokazati da je postojanje Boga logički kompatibilno sa zlom i patnjom. U 
istraživanju raspravljam o odgovoru koji bi se mogao nazvati nelogičkim odnosno »aporetič­
kim«. Prema aporetičkom odgovoru, problem zla pojavljuje se kao teško uhvatljiv, ali takvim se 
pojavljuje isključivo zbog ograničenosti ljudskog uma. S nezavisnog stajališta argumentiram da 
je ljudski um ograničen na karakterističan način: naše je iskustvo vrijednosti u bitnom smislu 
aspektnog oblika (aspectual	shape je termin koji koriste Tim Crane, John Searle i drugi iz pod­
ručja filozofije percepcije). Hipoteza je korisna za razumijevanje različitih sindroma u odnosu 
spram toga kako se vežemo za normativna područja poput etike, estetike, politike i religije. 




Aspektgestalt der Werterfahrung und das Problem des Bösen
Zusammenfassung
Traditionelle Antworten auf das Problem des Bösen können insofern als „logische“ Antworten 
eingestuft werden, als es ihr Ziel ist darzutun, dass die Existenz Gottes mit dem Bösen und dem 
Leiden logisch kompatibel ist. In der Forschungsarbeit bespreche ich die Antwort, die man als 
unlogisch bzw. „aporetisch“ bezeichnen könnte. Der aporetischen Antwort zufolge erscheint das 
Problem des Bösen als schwer erfassbar, jedoch erscheint es als solches ausschließlich wegen 
der Beschränkung der menschlichen Vernunft. Vom eigenständigen Standpunkt aus argumen­
tiere ich, dass die menschliche Vernunft in einer charakteristischen Weise begrenzt ist: Unsere 
Werterfahrung besitzt im wesentlichen Sinne die Aspektgestalt (aspectual	shape ist ein Terminus, 
der von Tim Crane, John Searle und anderen aus dem Gebiet der Wahrnehmungsphilosophie 
verwendet wird). Die Hypothese ist nützlich für das Verständnis verschiedener Syndrome in 
Bezug auf die Art und Weise, wie wir uns an normative Bereiche wie Ethik, Ästhetik, Politik 





La forme aspectuelle de l’expérience de la valeur et du problème du mal
Résumé
Les réponses traditionnelles au problème du mal peuvent être classées de réponses « logiques 
» dans la mesure où leur but est de montrer que l’existence de Dieu est logiquement compatible 
avec le mal et la souffrance. Dans cette recherche je discute de la réponse que l’on pourrait 
appeler non-logique, soit « aporétique ». Selon la réponse aporétique, le problème du mal 
apparaît comme difficile à saisir, mais il apparaît ainsi uniquement en raison des limites de la 
raison humaine. À partir d’une perspective indépendante, j’argumente que la raison humaine 
est limitée de façon caractéristique : notre expérience des valeurs présente en un sens premier 
une forme aspectuelle (aspectual	 shape est un terme qu’utilisent Tim Crane, John Searle et 
d’autres appartenant au domaine de la philosophie de la perception). L’hypothèse est utile 
pour la compréhension des divers syndromes en rapport avec comment l’on se lie aux sphères 
normatives telles que l’éthique, l’esthétique, la politique et la religion. De même, elle peut être 
utilisée pour la formation d’un cadre pour une nouvelle théodicée aporétique.
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